Ownership, property and women's bodies by Dickenson, Donna




Does advocating women’s reproductive rights require us to believe that women own a property in their bodies? In this chapter I will argue that it does not. Although the concept of owning our own bodies – ‘whose body is it anyway?’ – has polemical and political utility, it is incoherent in philosophy and law. Rather than conflate the entirely plausible concept of women’s reproductive rights and the implausible notion of property in the body, we should keep them separate, so that the weakness of the second concept does not contaminate the purity of the first.

It is perfectly true the notion of women owning property in their own bodies appears to represent an important step forward from the position that women can have no other relation to property than as its objects: that others have a property in women’s bodies but they themselves do not. Women are indeed treated as objects, as sexual property, in the new forms of chattel slavery, which many commentators have identified as being on the increase. However, a woman’s body is not literally sold in prostitution, so long as she is not a slave. Prostitution, still less trafficking, does not necessarily equate with the literal sale of women’s bodies. If women’s bodies are not being literally sold, then no property in women’s bodies is being assumed to exist. There is an enormous injustice, yes, but that is not the cause of it.

Trafficking does provide a contemporary and urgent instance of how the language of property in women’s bodies can be put to good political purposes by opponents ofgender injustice, just as it was in the earlier stages of second-wave feminism in relation to campaigns for the right to abortion, for example. The problem is not whether these campaigns are justified and necessary; in my view, they certainly are. Indeed, if anything the need to defend abortion rights is more vivid and pressing today than in the seventies. The question is whether the language of property in the body is the best language to use for these good political ends. This doubt is not just an academic irrelevance: If we use confused concepts, we risk allowing our opponents to dismiss our otherwise valid claims. Relying on weak arguments merely gives aid and comfort to the enemy.

There are other, better arguments on which we can rely to provide a firm foundation for women’s reproductive rights. I will conclude that in relation to abortion, IVF and egg extraction, women do possess a right in the labour of their bodies, although not in their bodies themselves. This right is unique to women’s labour in childbirth and pregnancy, not found in any other instances in medical ethics, and not capable of providing a similar foundation for men – because men simply do not labour to the same extent in the process of human reproduction. It means, in my view, that women possess an absolute and inviolable right to determine whether or not they will undergo pregnancy, submit to hormone stimulation in IVF, retain the children they bear in contract motherhood, or allow their ova to be used for other people’s ends. So the right to control one’s reproductive labour is in fact a very strong right, and, in my view, one which is more coherent philosophically than property in the body.

Why is property in the body a weak concept?
In this section I want to examine the weaknesses of property in the body as a philosophical concept. It is equally unsatisfactory from a legal point of view: we do not own our bodies, at least not in the Anglo-American legal tradition. Rather, the common law views tissue taken from the living body either as abandoned or as res nullius, no one’s thing; in relation to the dead body, the law of England only recently began to permit people to direct the disposal of their own bodies and still circumscribes the rights of relatives to control the uses to which the body may be put. Although the legal status of property in the body is an important topic in itself, however, for the purposes of this chapter I want to concentrate on the universally applicable philosophical aspects of the concept, not on legal peculiarities of the common law tradition. 

There are several ways to approach the question of why property in the body is philosophically incoherent. One route is through feminist theory’s insistence on the embodied self (Butler 1987), a notion also found elsewhere in philosophy, for example in Kant and Hegel (Dickenson 1997, p 92-103). Kant is often cited as the locus of the assertion that we are barred from using our bodies as mere tools, since that would entail treating ourselves as mere means--although to our own ends rather than those of another subject. In modern Kantians this prohibition is frequently expressed as an affront to our human dignity, our intrinsic value as members of the kingdom of ends, in contrast to the relative values that prevail in the commodified marketplace. While Kant clearly states that we are not authorised to sell any parts of our bodies, he seems to make exceptions for non-vital elements such as hair, although he is uneasy even about that. However, in other situations, for example in the permissible amputation of a diseased foot, Kant does appear to draw the dualistic distinction between body as object and moral person as subject, so that we are entitled to ‘use’ the body in such a way as to preserve the person. 

In more complete contradistinction to Cartesian mind-body dualism, Hegel denied that there was any such thing as a pure, transcendent self, existing apart from its embodied form. We only exist as embodied selves. If this is true, then our selves cannot be separated from our bodies, and we cannot be said to own our bodies. (, Dickenson, 1997, p100-101) There is literally nothing or no one there to do the owning. 

This has extremely important consequences for both marriage, as Hegel recognises, and prostitution, as he does not. Neither is a proper subject of contract: in other words, there can be no contracts of marriage or prostitution, because ‘the object about which a contract is made is a single external thing’ (Hegel, 1967, p75, emphasis added). Since we are embodied beings, a woman’s body cannot be that external thing to her. It is therefore incoherent to allow that a woman can be party to either a marriage contract or a trafficking contract, if the subject of the contract is conceived of as her body. If, however, the subject is seen as sexual services using the body, rather than the body itself, that may be another matter – although I have examined that argument elsewhere and also found it wanting. (Dickenson, 2005) 

The idea of the embodied self has been attractive to feminists, Hegelian and otherwise, who want to ‘reclaim the body’. Because the body has traditionally been associated in Christian interpretations with uncleanness, and likewise with women, reclaiming the body is a feminist project. For example, the feminist theorist Karen Green has argued for an embodied notion of reason, avoiding the dualistic division into mind and body, which often translates into men’s being associated with mind and reason, but women with body and emotion. (Green, 1995)

That, then, is one reason why the notion of owning the body is philosophically dubious: it relies on a dualistic split between self and body, but we are actually embodied selves. The second reason why we should distrust the notion that we own our bodies requires us to look more closely at the assumptions and history behind the commonly held belief that we do own our bodies. As John Maynard Keynes said, “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.” (Keynes, 1938, ch. 24, p. v)  Had Keynes been a philosopher rather than an economist, he might equally well have maintained that common-sense ideas usually come from dead philosophers. 

The ultimate source of the conventional belief that we own our bodies is usually thought to be John Locke, but in fact Locke never says we own our bodies; he is careful to distinguish between the labour of our bodies and our bodies themselves. (Waldron 1988) Thus on Lockean grounds there is indeed no general property in the physical body; but there is instead a property in the person, construed as agency and intention. We can only own that which we have laboured to create; we do not create our bodies in Lockean terms – God does: “Humans, then, do not have creators’ rights over their bodies. But they can be regarded in [a] strong sense as the creators of their own actions (and a fortiori of their work and labour).” (Waldron, 1988, p179) If there is anything special about my work, it is not that it is the labour of my body, but that it represents my agency, a part of my self, my moral personhood. It is intimately linked to my personhood, because a person can be seen as a being conscious of free and responsible action. People own their actions, including their labour; they do not own their bodies.

Even though some feminists have wrongly claimed that women do own their bodies (Hirschon, 1984, Pateman, 1988), the distinction between owning the body and owning the labour of the body is actually good news rather than a disaster, as far as women’s reproductive rights are concerned. I have argued elsewhere (Dickenson, 1997, ch. 3, 2001, 2002) that women’s reproductive labour, although not singled out by Locke, is a particularly strong instance of the right to the labour of our bodies. In Locke we have a property right in that with which we have mixed our labour, in what we have laboured to create. That right in turn derives from the link between our labour and our agency, our individuality, our personhood – not literally between our labour and our bodies, but between our labour and the uses to which we put our bodies for the sake of our aims, goals and projects.

In human reproduction, I argue, women labour to create other bodies, rather than their own. Therefore the products of women’s reproductive labour constitute the unique exception to the general principle that we cannot own our bodies, because God creates them, not we ourselves. Women do not create their own bodies, but they do create bodies for others. In fact this is not an exception to the principle found in Locke at all, but rather entirely consistent with the Lockean logic. Women do labour to create the bodies of their fetuses in pregnancy and childbirth. The labour which women put into superovulation, egg extraction and early pregnancy also qualifies as labour which confers a property right in a Lockean model, I think, and which can be a valuable protection against the commodification of reproductive tissue. 

However, one need not take a liberal, Lockean line to believe that women have a property right in their own reproductive labour. A feminist Marxist analysis would likewise support women’s property rights in the forms of embryonic tissue which they have laboured to create – in the stem cell technologies, for example – because they have added surplus value. The point is that the notion of women’s rights in their own reproductive labour is an important but underused weapon for women activists, one that can be justified philosophically, based on stronger arguments than the dubious concept of property in the body. It also gives women an innate strategic advantage, because only women can possess such a right, and only in relation to reproductive rights. Indeed, to accept the notion of property in the body is to privilege patriarchy, according to the feminist writer Moira Gatens, because male bodies are privileged above female in a phallocentric culture. (Gatens, 1992, p135)  

The notion of property in reproductive labour, on the other hand, gives women an advantage in very concrete examples of conflict with patriarchal norms, for example in relation to genetic parentage and ‘surrogate’ motherhood, as I shall try to show later. I shall also clarify the position in regard to which kinds of property rights in fetal tissue this right entails. For now, I simply want to make it clear that women do not own the bodies of their babies as they might own a car which they have bought with wages from salaried labour. They have certain kinds of property rights in their reproductive labour, but not all rights, and certainly not where another human being is concerned, once the baby has been born. Property is not an all-or-nothing concept, but it is something, and that something has been too little recognised in regard to women’s reproductive labour.

In the rest of this chapter, I want to use some concrete examples from reproductive rights and the New Reproductive Technologies to show how a Lockean labour theory of rights can more firmly ground women’s rights to reproductive entitlements and tissue than can the philosophically confused notion of property in the body. The three cases to which I shall apply the labour theory of women’s reproductive rights are abortion, contract motherhood, and the use of enucleated ova in the stem cell technologies. 

Abortion
Women’s property in the labour of pregnancy and childbirth is typically ignored by both sides in the abortion debate. Instead, the controversy normally centres on whether or not the fetus is a person. Even Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous defence of abortion uses a metaphor about housing the baby – the violinist hypothetical – and ignores the labour women put into labour itself, into childbirth. (Thomson, 1971) Opponents of abortion, similarly, give no weight to the pain and suffering entailed by childbirth, at best allowing an exception only if the women’s life is in danger – in contrast to all other patients, who are presumed to have a right to refuse pain and suffering. No competent adult other than a pregnant woman can be forced to submit to pain and suffering on behalf of another person: for example, even a tissue-matched relative cannot be forced to donate bone marrow. This inadequacy in the ethical debate is peculiar, not least because the fetus is not even a person in the common law. 

Only through women’s willingness to continue pregnancy and endure the labour of childbirth does the fetus become a person. If women are unwilling to put their reproductive labour to this purpose, whose countervailing rights can stop them? No one’s, I would argue, because the fetus is in fact no one – until the woman’s reproductive labour makes it someone. This is not just a matter of the law; it is a matter of physiology. Why is this palpable fact so easily ignored? Is it because women’s rights to control their labour in childbirth are the last great taboo?

To properly value women’s labour in childbirth leads to radical consequences in the abortion debate: to the absolute right of the woman to request abortion at any stage, even in the third trimester; to the absence of rights vested in the putative father; and to the absolute right of the woman to request abortion for any cause. Some may not be willing to follow this logic to its extreme, and may therefore question whether women’s property in their own reproductive labour is too dangerous a concept. To my way of thinking, it is not dangerous enough: it has been far too insufficiently recognised. The countervailing arguments, I think, are merely scaremongering. In fact the numbers of third-trimester terminations are very small; the common law already recognises that the father has no right to force the putative mother to undergo childbirth; and we should trust women not to undergo abortions for frivolous reasons, since the procedure itself is far from frivolous.

A more serious objection might be this: the pregnant woman’s property right in her own labour seems to extend to a property right in the baby. If we own that with which we mix our labour, on a Lockean argument, then the mother might be thought to own the baby. In fact the argument for property rights in and through labour does not go so far as to entail slavery, ownership of persons; it only extends to ownership of things. Something may be either a person or a thing in law;  I think it is abundantly clear that the baby is a person, not a thing, and therefore cannot be owned by the mother or anyone else. But what about contract motherhood and ‘surrogacy’? What are the implications for these areas of a woman’s property right in her own reproductive labour?

Contract motherhood
Because a woman has a sort of property right in her own reproductive labour does not necessarily mean that she can do whatever she likes with the fetus. Property is seen in jurisprudence as a ‘bundle’ or collection of rights, as several sets of interlocking relationships. In the case of abortion, we are mainly concerned with the right to exclude others from deciding on the abortion. This sort of property right might also be conceived of as a privilege, that is, a legal liberty or freedom,  “unlike a claim-right, which generates a corresponding duty in others to do something, a privilege involves not a correlative duty but the absence of a right on someone else’s part to interfere.” (Munzer, 1990, p18) There is also a case for calling the type of property right in labour enjoyed by a pregnant woman an immunity, from having her control challenged by anyone else. The right of ownership of real estate, for example, is an immunity against being forced to sell against one’s will.

In the case of ‘surrogacy’, or contract motherhood – the term I prefer because it does not prejudge that the birth mother is merely a ‘surrogate’ and not the ‘real’ mother – we are looking at a different sort of property right, a different stick in the bundle. The right in question is the power to transfer custody of a baby, once born, to another party for payment. Is this baby-selling? Does a woman’s reproductive property right in her labour extend this far? If babies are not objects but people, it might well be argued that this is indeed baby-selling, and that women’s reproductive rights should not extend to contract motherhood.

I think this is correct: the ‘surrogacy’ contract is clearly in the baby, and contracts in human beings are null and void in a non-slave society. This is indeed the position in English law, although not in American public policy. (In this sense contract motherhood is also a less than ideal term, since the contract is not binding.) However, there remain issues about the period before the birth of the baby, when the putative mother’s reproductive rights are insufficiently protected by the current position. That is, if a ‘surrogate’ mother miscarries, gives birth to a stillborn child, or suffers adverse consequences of pregnancy, she has no legal protections. So it seems to me that there is an argument for recognising women’s reproductive rights to undergo impregnation for the purposes of ‘surrogacy’, and to be compensated for any adverse events, but not to be compelled to hand over the baby after delivery, on the grounds that this is indeed baby-selling.

‘Surrogate’ motherhood illustrates how the concept of property in the body can be a two-edged sword for women’s rights. If we think in terms of property in the body, which men can possess as well, we may well be led down the path of accepting genetic parenthood as ‘real’ parenthood and gestational motherhood as less genuine. This is indeed what the term ‘surrogate’ implies, particularly in the case where the ‘surrogate’ is not also the genetic mother. That can have disastrous consequences for women, as was illustrated in the US case of Baby M, where the court, finding for the genetic father, William Stern, forced the gestational mother, Mary Beth Whitehead, to surrender the child at birth on the grounds that her only function had been ‘to be impregnated and to carry his child to term’ (In the Matter of Baby M, cited in, Dickenson, 1997, p160, emphasis added). Clearly the judge believed that the baby was already the ‘property’ of the father, and indeed the court added that Stern had never made a valid contract for the surrender of the child – not because such a contract would constitute baby-selling, but because “he cannot purchase what is already his.” (ibid.)

On the other hand, ‘surrogate’ motherhood has at least forced society and the courts to take women’s reproductive labour seriously. In another US case, that of Anna J (1991), the court did recognise that what the woman was selling was not the baby, but her pain and suffering in pregnancy and childbirth: not far off the idea of her property right in her own reproductive labour. To make that position consistent, however, the only part of the ‘surrogacy’ contract that should be enforceable would have to be the part up till the child’s birth. Although ‘surrogacy’ contracts may be seen as exploitative because they typically involve working-class women and middle-class commissioning couples, economic imbalance is not the real source of exploitation. The core difficulty is the failure to recognise women’s property rights in pregnancy and labour, particularly when ‘surrogates’ are seen as merely ‘renting out their wombs’. That is to radically downplay what women undergo in the labour of childbirth. 

Ova donation, cloning and stem cell technologies

How can women’s reproductive rights in their own labour be protected in relation to ova donation, cloning and the stem cell technologies? I want to conclude with the example of stem cell technologies, and the related issues of therapeutic cloning and the need for enucleated ova, because these issues illustrate the failure to count women’s reproductive labour into the equation. Just as the debate over abortion has centred on the status of the fetus, rather than the woman’s right to control her own labour in pregnancy and childbirth, so too has the controversy over reproductive cloning inevitably gravitated to the identity of the clone. In relation to therapeutic cloning and the stem cell technologies, interest has been solely focused on the status of the embryo or fetus as a source of the genetic material used. Only very occasionally (for example, Dickenson, 2001; Holm, 2002) has the need for enucleated ova in these technologies been mentioned as an ethical issue, and as a source of potential exploitation of women. 

There are two methods of producing stem cells which rely on embryonic or fetal material for the genetic content, each relying on women’s reproductive labour, but to a different degree. The first method uses embryos grown in vitro, developed through fertilisation of the mother’s ova with the father’s sperm: primarily ‘spare’ embryos which are not to be implanted. (It would also be possible to create embryos from gametes ‘harvested’ expressly for this purpose.) In this first method, stem cells are derived from the inner cell mass of the blastocysts; the outer cellular layer, which would normally develop into the placenta, is dissolved. Since the blastocysts are used before implantation, the woman’s ‘sweat equity’ is reduced, but she has still undergone the labour of stimulation with fertility drugs (super-ovulation) and extraction of ova – painful and moderately risky procedures. The second method relies on derived stem cells from primordial germ (gonadal) cells in aborted fetal tissue; here the woman has put in the labour and discomfort endurance of early pregnancy, along with enduring the pain of abortion-- arguably also form of ‘sweat equity’. 

In addition to these two methods of producing the genetic content of the stem cell’s nucleus, there is a third, less reliable method using adult somatic cells. This method is often said to be ethically neutral, because it does not raise issues about the moral status of the embryo or fetus. Thus, in attempting to find a compromise position in the highly polarised ethical debate around stem cell research – between nearly complete prohibition in Germany versus the more liberal position in the UK – it has generally been assumed that somatic stem cell technologies, which do not use embryonic or fetal tissue, raise few or no ethical problems. However, the need for enucleated ova in the stem cell technologies is just as great whether or not one uses embryonic, somatic or fetal tissue; indeed, somatic stem cell techniques are probably more wasteful of ova because they have a higher failure rate, adult cells being less totipotent. 

A genuine public policy debate must take into account possible pressures for illicit sale and import of enucleated ova, particularly since ova are also in short supply at IVF clinics. Particularly since enucleated ova have no genetic content (apart from small quantities of mitochondrial DNA) some researchers have also raised the spectre of exploitation of Third World women in supplying ova (Dickenson, 2002) Certainly there is already evidence of large quantities of ova being extracted (legally or illegally) and sold commercially in other countries, e.g. the United States (Jacobs et al., 2001), Croatia and Iran.

A feminist model sensitive to women’s alienation from their reproductive labour might want to take a more radical tack in countering commercial interests in the new stem cell technologies. This need not be a full-fledged property claim, and given the legal and philosophical incoherence of the concept of property in the body, it probably should not be. It need only be as great as to protect the tissue from being appropriated by others, under penalty of the Theft Act in the UK, for example, which has been ruled in one case (R. v. Kelly, cited in Grubb, 1998) to extend to body parts on which labour has been expended. In his influential model, A Theory of Property, Stephen Munzer argues that “persons do not own their bodies, but they do have limited property rights in them.” (Munzer, 1990, p41) These he views as primarily powers (to transfer, waive and exclude others from the use of one’s body parts) rather than as claim-rights (to possess, use, manage and receive income). (Munzer, 1990, p22, following Honore, 1961) As with contract motherhood, we would want to distinguish different sticks in the property bundle. The primary concern in this example would be to protect women from actual theft of their ova for use in the stem cell technologies, without their consent, or even from undue pressure to consent to dangerously high regimes of ovarian stimulation so that the extra ova can be used for commercial purposes.

Stem cell technologies highlight the ‘use-value’ which women produce in the reproductive labours of superovulation, egg extraction, and the work of early pregnancy and abortion. It is abundantly clear that these pregnancy-derived tissues have value, and enormous value. What is shown by the commodification of bodily products such as stem cells is that there is no firm divide, as Marx thought there was, between the use-values produced through social means of production and the absence of use-values in reproduction.
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